The Totemian EmpireParliament
HC Bill 28-16

National ID Act of 2026

Bill · House of Commons · 28th Totemian Parliament

Introduced October 31, 2026Updated November 1st, 202611:41 PM UTC

Currently before Parliament

Tribune Review

Tribune reviewNovember 1, 2026

The bill establishes national identity registration, citizen and refugee credentials, legal name records, credential authentication and a continuous issuance history. Credentials expire after six months and ordinarily cost 1,000 SL for initial issuance, renewal or holder requested replacement, with exceptions for official errors. It requires active ID for national candidacy and parliamentary office, makes a civilian firearms requirement contingent on referendum approval, and imposes detailed security standards on official digital services with a temporary hardware authenticator exception.

A centralized identity and digital security framework combining strong record safeguards with paid credential requirements that narrow access to candidacy, parliamentary office and potentially civilian firearms.

What it does

  1. Ss. 2 and 3: continues the Civil Registry under its shortened name, defines Registrar General and deputy leadership, permits recorded supervisory assignments, and makes the Office the authoritative custodian of specified identity and civil status records.
  2. S. 3, proposed registration ss. 8 through 10: requires permission bounded functional assignments, preserved source authority and change histories, reasoned adverse decisions, correction procedures and published services with ministerial supervision.
  3. S. 4, proposed Art. 8 ss. 1 through 3: recommends active ID for citizens, establishes account linked Class A and nonaccount Class B credentials, and provides Class R credentials for persons with a competent grant of refuge without conferring citizenship or activity eligibility.
  4. S. 4, proposed Art. 8 ss. 4 through 8: requires legal names, gender, residence, portrait and signature, preserves separately typed name components and scripts, excludes official titles from legal names, permits additional gender entries and protects optional street addresses.
  5. S. 4, proposed Art. 8 ss. 9 and 10: assigns stable person numbers and distinct issuance references, preserves allocation inputs and original numbers through later changes, and sets automatic six calendar month credential expiry under a published time zone.
  6. S. 4, proposed Art. 8 ss. 11 and 12: blocks issuance until required identity, portrait, signature, authenticator and fee conditions are met and applies legally competent status restrictions only to the requested activity.
  7. S. 4, proposed Art. 8 s. 13: charges 1000 SL per initial, renewed or holder requested replacement credential, credits the Collections Fund, and prevents charges for rejected applications, mere account linking, history retrieval and authority caused corrections, with refund and duplicate charge protections.
  8. S. 5, proposed Art. 9 s. 1: requires defined identity particulars, a recognizable national flag and bilingual credentials with Totemic labels at least 20% larger than corresponding English labels.
  9. S. 5, proposed Art. 9 ss. 2 through 7: requires a credential bound Eagle Authentication Seal, trusted issuer signatures and approved media profiles, excludes authentication secrets from the card, and requires authenticated bindings and replacement after material issuance changes.
  10. S. 5, proposed Art. 9 ss. 8 through 10: specifies the initial EAS PNG profile using deterministic CBOR, COSE Sign1 and ES256, all required signed identifiers and timestamps, an immutable issuance snapshot, and a bounded native PNG carrier with snapshot and image digest verification.
  11. S. 5, proposed Art. 9 ss. 11 and 12: rejects altered, transplanted or unsupported credentials, requires separate profiles for transformed images, distinguishes capture failures from forgery, and requires published specifications and conformance tests while recognizing that an intact image copy is not holder authentication.
  12. S. 5, proposed Art. 9 s. 13: allows Imperial authorization of standard and special designs after consultation, permits proposals by any person or organization without a fixed sponsorship fee or support threshold, preserves parliamentary standards and mandatory credential features, and creates no additional compulsory variant fee.
  13. S. 6, proposed Art. 10: requires authorized automatic record prefill, stable account selection, source and conflict distinctions, protected corrections and applicant changes, exact name preservation, idempotent issuance and server enforced permissions and conditions.
  14. S. 7, proposed Art. 11 ss. 1 through 3: requires ordered verification of number, issuance consistency, issuer trusted seal, holder PIN, applicable passkey and final validity, with no successful result while an applicable stage remains unsatisfied.
  15. S. 7, proposed Art. 11 ss. 4 and 5: requires a private 8 to 12 digit holder PIN with protected storage and failure limits, plus a fresh holder passkey assertion for account linked credentials, independent of the Processor's authentication.
  16. S. 7, proposed Art. 11 ss. 6 through 9: requires current issuance status, purpose relevant restrictions, distinct authenticity and authorization outcomes, session bound audit records and disclosure limited to a lawful verification purpose.
  17. S. 8, proposed Art. 12 ss. 1 through 5: provides renewal, loss reporting, suspension, secure recovery, reasoned revocation and correction, review routes and preserved signature versions, without changing citizenship or refuge merely through expiry or authentication failure.
  18. S. 8, proposed Art. 12 ss. 6 through 9: requires automatic access and change logs, protected history, retention rules, backups, incident and key controls, published tested technical requirements and separation of electoral identity records from secret choices.
  19. S. 8, proposed Art. 12 ss. 10 through 12: maintains a permanent account independent person history, automatically associates verified historical credentials upon account linking, preserves dated legal status transitions and immutable snapshots, and requires evidenced, reversible reconciliation of duplicates.
  20. S. 9: requires active National ID for parliamentary and Chancellery candidacy and assumption of either House's seats, provides correction opportunities, protects confidential identifiers and leaves later removal or vacancy consequences to the Constitution.
  21. S. 10: replaces the existing lawful identity entry in civilian firearm registration with verified legal name and active National ID, and requires active ID for acquiring or possessing civilian firearms, subject to the referendum condition in s. 12.
  22. S. 11, proposed Art. 17 ss. 1 through 3: applies all relevant ASVS 5.0.0 Levels 1, 2 and 3 requirements to official digital services and supporting systems, including contractors, and requires evidence for implementation or genuine inapplicability.
  23. S. 11, proposed Art. 17 ss. 2, 4 and 5: classifies the main and Parliament domains and controlling dependencies as critical, requires phishing resistant passkeys and user verification for protected human access, and distinguishes ordinary AAL2 access, privileged AAL3 access and authenticated Processor assistance for nonaccount holders.
  24. S. 11, proposed Art. 17 ss. 6 and 7: requires protected identity records and backups, separate key management, operation specific authorization, access records, costly salted PIN verifiers and exclusion of secret authentication material and biometric samples from ordinary collection or logs.
  25. S. 11, proposed Art. 17 ss. 8 and 9: temporarily defers only hardware dependent authenticator requirements while retaining AAL2 passkeys and other safeguards, requires disclosure of the exception, and conditions activation on verified readiness and a separately signed declaration with express Imperial approval.
  26. S. 11, proposed Art. 17 s. 10: requires a qualified security assessment before deployment and material sensitive changes, correction of applicable failed controls before affected protected functions enter production, and lawful published changes to incorporated standard versions.
  27. S. 12: automatically submits the firearms amendments to a referendum requiring 60% approval and certification, provides a scheduled November vote only if the qualification and notice conditions are met, supplies an earliest lawful fallback and prescribes neutral ballot wording and a 90 day parliamentary protection notice.
  • national identity
  • civil registry
  • digital security
  • privacy
  • elections
  • firearms
  • refugees
  • fees
  • authentication
EconomicFiscalCivil LibertiesCentralisationSocietySovereigntyWelfareRule of LawCrown AuthoritySecurity & DefenceJusticeChurch & StateNational IdentityLabour & CapitalEnvironment & DevelopmentPolitical EqualityDemocratic ParticipationTransparency & Accountability
A centralized identity and digital security framework combining strong record safeguards with paid credential requirements that narrow access to candidacy, parliamentary office and potentially civilian firearms.Strongest: Transparency & Accountability Open Accountability · hover an axis
Civil Liberties+45 · Authoritarian85% confidence
LibertarianAuthoritarian

The Act centralizes extensive identity records and conditions candidacy, office and potentially civilian firearm possession on renewable authenticated credentials, while limiting disclosure and protecting secrets.

From provision 3, provision 4, provision 5, provision 6, provision 14, provision 15, provision 16, provision 17, provision 18, provision 19, provision 20, provision 21, provision 24

Centralisation+40 · Centralist80% confidence
DevolutionistCentralist

Ss. 3 through 8 establish national authoritative identity, issuance and verification functions, and s. 11 binds all state organs and contracted digital services to common security requirements.

From provision 1, provision 2, provision 3, provision 5, provision 13, provision 14, provision 19, provision 22, provision 23

Rule of Law-55 · Constitutionalist85% confidence
ConstitutionalistDiscretionary

The Act binds issuance, restrictions, recovery and deployment to explicit lawful prerequisites, purpose limits and tested security requirements, with a defined and documented hardware transition.

From provision 2, provision 6, provision 11, provision 13, provision 14, provision 16, provision 17, provision 20, provision 22, provision 23, provision 25, provision 26

Crown Authority+20 · Monarchist55% confidence
ParliamentaristMonarchist

Proposed Arts. 9 and 17 reserve credential design authorization and hardware commencement approval to the Emperor, a limited additional approval role rather than a constitutional transfer of legislative supremacy.

From provision 12, provision 25, provision 26

National Identity+25 · Nationalist70% confidence
PluralistNationalist

Proposed Art. 9 requires the national flag and materially larger Totemic labels on every credential, while Class R recognizes lawful refuge without granting citizenship.

From provision 3, provision 8

Political Equality+40 · Status Privilege75% confidence
Equal StandingStatus Privilege

A recurring 1000 SL credential charge becomes a material resource gate to candidacy and office without a general hardship waiver, despite free corrections and nonaccount access options.

From provision 3, provision 5, provision 6, provision 7, provision 20

Democratic Participation+50 · Gatekept Democracy85% confidence
Participatory DemocracyGatekept Democracy

S. 9 requires active paid National ID before candidacy and parliamentary assumption, narrowing political access, while s. 12 gives citizens the final decision on the separate firearms condition.

From provision 5, provision 6, provision 7, provision 20, provision 27

Transparency & Accountability-70 · Open Accountability90% confidence
Open AccountabilityOpaque Discretion

Reasoned decisions, continuous attributable histories, automatic access logs, review routes, published technical profiles and documented security assessments establish substantial administrative answerability without opening private identity records.

From provision 2, provision 9, provision 10, provision 11, provision 13, provision 16, provision 17, provision 18, provision 19, provision 22, provision 25, provision 26

Calibrated by the bill's own provisions — magnitude reflects how strongly it acts on each axis.